

# Lessons Learned From Cyber Security Assessments of SCADA and Energy Management Systems

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# **LESSONS LEARNED FROM CYBER SECURITY ASSESSMENTS OF SCADA AND ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The results from ten cyber security vulnerability assessments of process control, SCADA and energy management systems, or components of those systems were reviewed to identify common problem areas. The common vulnerabilities ranged from conventional IT security issues to specific weaknesses in control system protocols.

In each vulnerability category, relative measures were assigned to the severity of the vulnerability and ease with which an attacker could exploit the vulnerability. Suggested mitigations are identified in each category. Recommended mitigations having the highest impact on reducing vulnerability are listed for asset owners and system vendors.

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## ACRONYMS

ARP	Address Resolution Protocol
CRADA	Cooperative Research And Development Agreement
DMZ	De-Militarized Zone
DNS	Domain Name Service
EMS	Energy Management System
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
IP	Internet Protocol
IPS	Intrusion Prevention System
IT	Information Technology
LAN	Local Area Network
NSTB	National SCADA Test Bed
OS	Operating System
SCADA	Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SSH	Secure Shell
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
UDP	User Datagram

# **LESSONS LEARNED FROM CYBER SECURITY ASSESSMENTS OF SCADA AND ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS**

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) established the National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) Program to help industry and government improve the security of the control systems used in the nation's critical energy infrastructures. The NSTB Program is funded and directed by the DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE). A key part of the program is the assessment of digital control systems to identify vulnerabilities that could put the systems at risk for a cyber attack.

This report summarizes the findings from cyber security assessments performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) as part of the NSTB Program. Findings are also included from INL assessments performed for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Control System Security Program, managed by INL for the DHS National Cyber Security Division.

The systems that were assessed ranged in complexity from a perimeter protection device, to small digital control systems, to large Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition/Energy Management Systems (SCADA/EMS) with complex networks, multiple servers and millions of lines of code. Assessments were performed in the INL SCADA Test Bed, in an INL process control systems test bed, and in operational installations (examining non-production or off-line systems).

SCADA/EMS were of the greatest interest in the assessments because of their usual interconnections to critical infrastructure control equipment ranging from valves in oil and gas pipelines to switches and breakers in the national electric grid. If compromised, these systems provide a path to many critical end devices and to other SCADA/EMS

This report includes information from ten assessments performed within the DOE and DHS programs in the time period from late 2004 through early 2006. These assessments were performed under Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) between the system vendors or asset owners and the INL. The vendors and owners provided software, hardware, training, and technical support. The INL performed the cyber assessments and reported the results, including recommendations on ways to mitigate the vulnerabilities found. As noted above, some of these assessments were conducted at INL, others at asset owners' sites. Under the terms of the CRADAs and associated nondisclosure agreements, proprietary information is withheld from public disclosure. Results are therefore presented in a generic fashion in order to protect proprietary information, but every effort has been made to be specific enough to benefit those who provide, use, and secure the systems controlling our nation's critical infrastructure. The report focuses on vulnerabilities that were observed across multiple assessments. A fundamental criterion for including a vulnerability or recommendation in this report was that it is identified in at least two independent assessments. The results summarized in this report describe vulnerabilities that were found to be common in field installations, spanning different control system vendor and asset owner configurations. Asset owners can use these observations, and the corresponding recommendations for mitigation, as a basis for enhancing the security of their control systems. Control system vendors, system integrators, and third-party vendors can use the lessons learned to enhance the security characteristics of current and future products.

The report is divided into sections describing the assessment methodologies, a detailed presentation of the assessment results and analysis, and recommendations for vendors and asset owners.

## **2. ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES**

The configuration of the tested systems varied considerably depending on the vendor's equipment, where the assessment was conducted (laboratory or in the field), and the specific objectives of the assessment. In all cases, the architecture and boundaries for the system under test were carefully determined. Standardized self-assessment tools were not used; targets of evaluation were developed individually for each assessment.

### **2.1 *Field Assessments***

Field assessments were conducted on several systems that had been previously assessed in-house at the INL. The field assessment methodology for these systems focused on the security defenses configured. Reviewing of code, vulnerability scanning, and manipulation of end devices were not part of the field assessments due to the likely impact on operations. Some network scanning was done on non-production systems if available and the asset owner verified no impact to operations. The limited amount of time available for a field assessment constrained the scope of the assessment. These assessments were tightly coordinated with the owner of the systems due to sensitivities on affecting the operational environment. All of these assessments were done on non-production configurations.

### **2.2 *Process Control Systems and Component Assessments***

The assessment of process control systems and components focused on the architecture and communication paths of the system. These systems were normally loaded on one or a limited number of PCs. These in-house laboratory assessments allowed for more scrutiny since the concern for impact on a production operation system was absent. The use of vulnerability scanners, code reviews, and manipulation of data to affect end devices were possible in these assessments. The targets of evaluation were developed and modified based on the testing results. This flexibility was available because the system was in the laboratory and not competing for production resources.

### **2.3 *SCADA and SCADA/EMS Assessments***

Assessments of several larger SCADA and SCADA/EMS systems were performed in-house at the INL SCADA Test Bed. These systems reside on multiple servers but could be pared down to a single server installation in some cases. These systems generally involve a greater degree of connectivity to other systems or applications than the process control systems. Targets of evaluation were developed and modified based on the previous results. The SCADA, EMS, and process control systems were configured based on the manufacturers' recommendations. These assessments were coordinated with the vendor, with plans and results shared.



### 3. AGGREGATION OF ASSESSMENT RESULTS

The final reports from ten assessments were reviewed to identify common areas of vulnerabilities, characterize the relative risk associated with these vulnerabilities, and determine appropriate mitigation strategies. Only those vulnerabilities that were specifically identified in the formal reports were included; this excluded vulnerabilities whose existence was suggested only through informal discussions with the principal investigators. Reported vulnerabilities are included in this summary regardless of whether or not they were actually exploited during the assessment. All specific data from these assessments are controlled by the owner of the configuration or the vendor. The results are only presented if at least two dissimilar configurations demonstrated the same vulnerability.

#### 3.1 Categorization of Vulnerabilities

We note that currently there is not a commonly-accepted taxonomy for vulnerabilities. For the purposes of this aggregated review, vulnerabilities identified during the assessments were grouped into categories. The categories were defined based on the technical characteristics of the vulnerabilities observed. These categories are described in Table 1.

**Table 1. Characteristic categories for vulnerabilities**

Category	Description
Clear Text Communications	Clear text (unencrypted) communications were observed in network traffic (through packet sniffing). The clear text revealed user names and passwords which might permit replay attacks or simplify the process of reverse engineering of the data protocol. In some cases, clear text communications were observed between the control system network and the external corporate network segments.
Account Management	Privileged accounts were found with default or easily guessed user names and passwords; hard-coded usernames and passwords were defined in documentation or extracted from binary executables or configuration files; password protection policies were weak.
Weak or No Authentication	Little or no authentication of host-to-host communications, increasing the vulnerability of the system to impersonation, replay, or man-in-the-middle attacks
Coding Practices	Disassembly or decompilation of executable code revealed potentially unsafe coding styles (particularly with respect to string handling and buffer management); applications vulnerable to crashing on deliberately malicious input
Unused Services	Services with known vulnerabilities were running on hosts; need for the service was not apparent in the system architecture
Network Addressing	Network address resolution protocols (DNS, ARP, etc.) were exploitable by spoofing or other bypassing schemes.
Scripting and Interface	Batch files and other script files (Perl, etc.) could be exploited

Programming	with malicious input or other techniques.
Unpatched Components	Software modules were not current versions, and contained known exploitable vulnerabilities that were required by the configuration.
Web Servers and Clients	Web servers were not securely configured, allowing directory traversal or file modification.
Perimeter Protection	Connections initiated from outside the SCADA perimeter; firewalls had unnecessary open ports; access control lists were misconfigured.
Enumeration	Web servers and other network services revealed version information that could be of use to an attacker.

These categories were further subdivided by the types of vulnerabilities observed. The vulnerability classes were defined only when at least two assessments from widely varying configurations exhibited the deficiencies in that class. This was intended to eliminate vulnerability classes that were unique to only one assessment, and to ensure the classes encompassed common deficiencies across multiple assessments.

### **3.2 Identification of Recommended Mitigations**

After the reported vulnerabilities were categorized as described above, a set of corresponding recommendations for mitigation was developed. The recommended mitigations were developed based on those recommended in the assessment reports, and from reviews by computer security experts. The recommended mitigations tend to be general in nature, with the intent of being applicable to vulnerabilities identified in multiple assessments. As such, they are generic recommendations and require further refinement before implementation on any specific system. A majority of the recommendations will require vendor development, not just a configuration change that can be done by the end users. Based on typical maintenance agreements, changes may have to be approved by the maintenance provider prior to implementation. All changes will have to be tested to determine the impact to production and operations. Some mitigations would require extensive rewrites and are not feasible for application to current software releases. In these cases other defensive measures are needed.

### **3.3 Rating of Vulnerabilities**

To characterize the risk associated with the identified vulnerabilities, two measures were established:

- Ease of Attack
- Severity of Impact

A subjective scale (High, Medium, or Low) was used for each of these. The scales are designed such that a "High" rating corresponds to a greater threat to system security. The rating of vulnerabilities was conducted by the authors in consultation with the computer security and control system experts that conducted the original assessments.

#### **3.3.1 Ease of Attack**

This measure is a subjective evaluation of how easily the vulnerability could be exploited by an attacker. This evaluation considered the relative degree of technical skill that an attacker would

need, what extent of system-specific knowledge would be required, and how much time would be needed to exploit the vulnerability. The likelihood of attack detection is not considered in this measure.

**Table 2. Measures for Ease of Attack**

Rating	Criteria
<b>NONE</b> (green)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [not considered exploitable]</li> <li>• An exploit was attempted but did not succeed</li> </ul>
<b>LOW</b> (yellow)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exploitable only by a highly-skilled attacker</li> <li>• Would require days or weeks to exploit</li> <li>• Knowledge of the control system is necessary</li> </ul>
<b>MEDIUM</b> (orange)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Would require a day or less to exploit, or would require the use of multiple scripts or techniques to accomplish the exploit</li> </ul>
<b>HIGH</b> (red)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exploit tools are available to unskilled attackers</li> <li>• Exploit can be accomplished in less than an hour</li> </ul>

It is assumed that an attacker has already gained access to an appropriate point in the system to conduct the exploit. This measure does not address the difficulty an attacker might face in reaching the point where the vulnerability could be exploited, but instead how easily can an attacker proceed from that point. That is, this measure assumes that the attacker is inside the security perimeter of the system.

The Ease of Attack is characterized twice, once for the “As Found” condition during the assessment, and again for the “After” case assuming that the recommended mitigations are implemented.

### 3.3.2 Severity of Impact

This measure is a subjective evaluation of the extent to which system operability could be impacted by a successful exploit. As with the “Ease of Attack” measure, it is assumed that the attacker has already gained access to the appropriate point in the system in order to conduct the exploit. To state this in different terms, this measure attempts to characterize the incremental loss of system security resulting from the exploit.

**Table 3. Measures for Severity of Impact**

Rating	Criteria
<b>NONE</b> (green)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• no impact</li> </ul>
<b>LOW</b> (yellow)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• attacker can gain additional information that is not directly exploitable (e.g., usernames without passwords, application version numbers, etc.)</li> </ul>
<b>MEDIUM</b> (orange)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• attacker can degrade system performance</li> </ul>
<b>HIGH</b> (red)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• attacker can act as a legitimate control system user</li> <li>• attacker can gain administrative rights (“root” privileges)</li> <li>• attacker can evade detection, conduct man-in-the-middle attacks to spoof operator displays</li> </ul>

### **3.4 *Frequency of Occurrence***

As described elsewhere in this document, each assessment had different goals. Not every assessment examined all of the vulnerability areas defined in the matrices. The summary data tables (Table 4) include a description of how many of the assessments included a particular area in the assessment. For example, an entry of “3/5” indicates that only five of the assessments considered that vulnerability area, and three of the assessments actually exhibited relevant vulnerabilities.

### **3.5 *Summary of Assessment Results***

Table 4 is a summary of the relative ease of attack in the different vulnerability categories, both before and after recommendations for mitigation are implemented. Some recommendations require substantial vendor involvement and cannot be implemented simply with a configuration change. Recommended vendor involvement is noted in the comments section. This table is an aggregation of the results from individual assessments. In some vulnerability classes, the ease of attack varied across individual assessments; this is indicated by multiple columns. Given the range of goals in individual assessments, and the details of specific vulnerabilities, the table reflects some unavoidable mixing of dissimilar elements. However, the vulnerabilities identified and the recommended mitigation approaches do tend to be applicable across the range of systems.



Table 4. Benefit of recommended mitigations

Key:



Red = Could be attacked by someone of moderate skill level with commonly available tools

Orange = Could be attacked with someone of enhanced skill level

Yellow = Could only be attacked by someone of high skill level with enough time and resources

Green = Not likely to be exploitable

Category	Vulnerability Class	Recommendation for Mitigation	Ease of Attack		Notes / Comments	
			Before Mitigation	After Mitigation		
Clear Text Communications	Passwords and Accounts (5/6)	Encrypt communication (SSL/SSH), where feasible	L	M	Encrypted communications would require > 1 week to compromise	
		Disable clear text services				Vendor Involvement
	Replay Possible (6/6)	Encryption, where feasible	L			
	Reverse Engineer Protocol (6/6)	Encryption, where feasible (SSL)	L	L	-	Days to weeks to compromise if unencrypted
		Improve robustness of data validation in protocol		L		Vendor Involvement
	Inter-network communication (4/6)	Disable service, where feasible	M		-	
	Encryption, where feasible Use a network DMZ			-		
Account Management	Default Accounts (3/5)	Change default accounts and passwords	H	H	-	

Category	Vulnerability Class	Recommendation for Mitigation	Ease of Attack		Notes / Comments
			Before Mitigation	After Mitigation	
Authentication	Hard-coded or documented Passwords (3/5)	Avoid storing hard-coded credential information, or store password hashes instead of plaintext passwords	H	M	Hashed password still visible but would take longer to compromise
		Obfuscate login information text in source code via conversion routines		M	Obfuscated password still visible but would take longer to compromise
	Session Weaknesses (3/3)	Rewrite the software to require both username and password before validating credentials	M	H	Vendor involvement
		Configuration file to limit access attempts, where feasible			Substantial increase in difficulty to compromise (> days)
	Weak Passwords and password expiration (5/6)	Improve password policies and employ password complexity requirements	M	H	Strong passwords would take weeks to compromise
		Modify software to allow strong passwords			
	No Authentication (4/7)	Enforce authentication	L	M	Vendor involvement
		Upgrade OS to one with better authentication, where feasible			
		Hardware authentication, where feasible			
	Weak Authentication (3/6)	Eliminate older protocols	L	H	Vendor involvement

Category	Vulnerability Class	Recommendation for Mitigation	Ease of Attack		Notes / Comments
			Before Mitigation	After Mitigation	
Coding Practices	Unchecked data stream resulting in buffer overflow (6/6)	Hardware authentication, where feasible, or other host-specific authentication		-	
		Use commercially available tools during development to check for unsafe conditions	L	-	Vendor Involvement
		Use robust set of data validation and sanity checking		-	Vendor Action
	Miscellaneous (5/6)	Don't use language that has unsafe buffer operations, where feasible	L	-	Vendor Involvement
		Ensure the latest patches are implemented		-	Vendor Involvement
		Don't hardcode database tables (use configuration files)		-	Vendor Involvement
		Use encryption, where feasible		-	Vendor Involvement
	Reverse engineering (4/4)	Improve established policies during software development and throughout software life	L	-	Vendor Involvement
		Use code obfuscation if applicable		-	Vendor Involvement
		Use hardware or firmware based equipment		-	Vendor Involvement
Unused Services	Ensure strict file system access	L		Compromise slowed by a few hours Vendor Involvement	
	Disable / remove unused services	H	-	Vendor Assistance	



Category	Vulnerability Class	Recommendation for Mitigation	Ease of Attack		Notes / Comments
			Before Mitigation	After Mitigation	
Network Addressing	Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) (5/5)	Establish administrative policies to include documentation and periodic review of necessary services		-	Vendor Assistance
		Encrypt, where feasible	L	-	Vendor Assistance
		Strict control of traffic through routers		-	Vendor Assistance
		Hardcode ARP tables, where feasible		-	Vendor assistance
		Detection of unusual network traffic with IDS		-	
	Other exploitable addresses (3/3)	Patching	L	-	Vendor Assistance
Scripting or Other interface programming	Various (3/6)	Encryption, where feasible	M	-	Vendor Assistance
		Establish administrative policies to not allow browsing from control system network to Internet	H	L	Time to compromise increases from hours to days
		Use DMZ, proxy servers, IDS to watch traffic	M	L	Increased likelihood of detection
		Filter or block unnecessary traffic		L	Time to compromise increases from hours to days
		Patching		-	
		Use robust data validation and sanity checking			Vendor Assistance
Unpatched Components	Various (4/6)	Update patches	H	-	Vendor Assistance

Category	Vulnerability Class	Recommendation for Mitigation	Ease of Attack		Notes / Comments
			Before Mitigation	After Mitigation	
Web servers and web clients	Various (5/5)	Administrative policies to ensure periodic review		-	Vendor Assistance
		Eliminate unneeded services		-	Vendor Assistance
		Ensure latest patches are made	L M H	-	Vendor Assistance
		Establish well defined system configuration controls		-	Vendor Assistance
		Administrative policies to eliminate default configurations, test servlets, and configuration directories		-	Vendor Involvement
		Use DMZ, if server is necessary else shutdown or don't use the server		-	Vendor Assistance
		Initiate connections from the most secure to the less secure sub-networks			Vendor Involvement
		Configuration of web server	H	-	Vendor Assistance
Perimeter Protection	Directory Traversal (4/4)	Set correct file permissions			Vendor Assistance
		Administrative policies concerning laptop use	L H	-	
	Additional connections bypassing protection (2/3)	Periodic access point audits		-	
		Network integrity audits		-	
	Exploitable ports and services (6/6)	Disable or remove any unneeded services	L H	-	Vendor Assistance
		Patches to latest revisions		-	Vendor Assistance

Category	Vulnerability Class	Recommendation for Mitigation	Ease of Attack		Notes / Comments
			Before Mitigation	After Mitigation	
		Detection and monitoring		<b>L</b>	Probable improved chances of detection Vendor Assistance
		Use hardware from multiple vendors		<b>L</b>	Compromise slowed but not prevented Vendor Assistance
		Disable or remove any unneeded services	<b>H</b>	-	Vendor Assistance
		Patches to latest revisions		-	
		Close unnecessary ports		-	
		Configure firewall correctly		-	
		Set a default-deny on connections		-	Vendor Assistance
		Add filtering to disable pinging		-	
		Obfuscate banners or eliminate, if not needed	<b>H</b>	<b>M</b>	Reduces the information available to an attacker, increasing the time to compromise Vendor Assistance
Enumeration	Revealing Versions (6/6)				

## 4. RECOMMENDATIONS

Table 4 include suggested mitigation strategies in each vulnerability category. Some of these actions can be implemented in the field by asset owners; other mitigations involve design changes that must originate with vendors and system integrators. This section identifies high priority recommendations for each of those groups.

The recommendations address vulnerabilities with high or moderate severity that can be eliminated or made much more difficult to attack successfully. Due to the unique characteristics inherent in every system, it will not be possible to apply every recommended mitigation in any particular system design or deployment. However, a defense-in-depth strategy should be used to avoid over-reliance on any one particular security measure.

### 4.1 Recommendations for Asset Owners

These recommendations primarily apply to the in-the-field configuration. As one might expect, they reflect common practices in conventional IT security. Effective implementation of some of these recommendations will require cooperation from vendors and system integrators.

Action #1:	Implement effective patch management policies to ensure that operating systems and installed applications are kept as up-to-date as possible with released patches.
Benefit:	Reduces the exposed attack surface associated with known vulnerabilities. Patches are frequently released in response to publicly identified vulnerabilities.
Considerations:	Close coordination with control system vendors is needed to ensure compatibility of operating system and security patches with control system servers and workstations. Negotiate a flaw remediation with the vendor and the expected time from discovery to correction. Coordinate with the vendor to identify defense in depth strategies to protect the system prior to implementing the patch or upgrade.

Action #2:	Remove or disable unnecessary services on control system servers and workstations. Only those services required for control system operation should be enabled.
Benefit:	Eliminates the readily exploitable code associated with such services.
Considerations:	Verify list of required services with control system vendor. During factory acceptance testing and site acceptance testing, vulnerability scans can be conducted on these non-production configurations. The results will identify known vulnerabilities in components and the patching levels needed. This output can also be used to identify all applications on the system and aids in the elimination of unneeded components. This activity can also be done on non-production configurations if not in a procurement activity.

Action #3:	Adopt account management policies reflecting conventional IT best practices. Replace default usernames whenever possible. Establish password policies ensuring appropriate password complexity and prohibiting short or easily guessed passwords.
Benefit:	Reduces or eliminates the vulnerabilities ranging from default accounts to weak passwords that provide opportunities for an intruder to gain entry into the system.

Considerations:	Coordinate with control system vendor on any default usernames. Identify session weakness such as cookies or remembered account names between sessions and coordinate with the vendor for resolution. Coordinate with in-house IT department for account, password and user activity logging to identify areas where resources and policies can be joined.
Action #4:	Isolate the control system perimeter from the corporate network by an appropriate combination of firewalls and DMZs. Configure firewalls to block inbound connections, and limit outbound connections to only those specifically required for operations. Only allow specifically necessary network protocols in the DMZ; block or filter unnecessary protocols. Eliminate network connections that bypass perimeter protection.
Benefit:	Eliminates weaknesses in control system perimeter protection and increases the difficulty for an external attacker to exploit other vulnerabilities. Because of its public visibility and accessibility, the corporate network is vulnerable to intrusion through the use of publicly available hacking tools. Without the added protection of a DMZ or carefully configured firewalls, disruption of the control network is possible by relatively unskilled attackers.
Considerations:	Work with vendor or system integrator to identify all traffic between control system or SCADA and the DMZ. Identify the originator of the communication and the sequence of re-establishing communications upon failure. This information is critical in designing a DMZ. Coordinate with in-house IT departments for relevant expertise to identify areas where resources and policies can be joined.
Action #5:	Implement security hardening of web servers located within the control system network (or having access to the control system network) to establish least access permissions.
Benefit:	Eliminates directory traversal attacks and other common vulnerabilities.
Considerations:	(none identified)

Asset owners may also wish to determine if vulnerability assessments have been conducted on systems similar to their own; this information would be available through the respective system vendors. If assessments have been conducted, the results should be reviewed to identify any system-specific vulnerabilities that merit additional field mitigations. For new procurements, asset owners should consider the recommendations for system vendors during the specification and bid evaluation process.

## **4.2 Recommendations for System Vendors**

Vendors who have conducted assessments on their own systems will already be familiar with the detailed findings for their system. The following recommendations primarily apply to system design, rather than field deployment issues.

Action #1:	Establish patch management and review processes to verify compatibility of patches for operating systems and required third-party applications.
Benefit:	Reduces the exposed attack surface by eliminating known vulnerabilities that are often published in the open.
Considerations:	(none identified)

Action #2:	Modify protocols to eliminate clear text network transmission of usernames and passwords. As a minimum, passwords should be transmitted only in a suitable hashed or encrypted format.
Benefit:	Eliminates an attacker's ability to easily obtain this information and then use it to gain access to the control
Considerations:	(See section below regarding Encrypted Protocols)

Action #3:	Modify protocols to include support for authentication of connections between sender and receiver.
Benefit:	Eliminates the vulnerabilities associated with impersonation, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks
Considerations:	May require action by industry standards organizations

Action #4:	Adopt appropriate software development life cycle practices to eliminate common coding errors that affect security, particularly with respect to input data validation and buffer management.
Benefit:	Eliminates many common sources of security vulnerabilities that allow uploading of malicious code onto control system servers
Considerations:	Also applies to system integrators who perform software development for turnkey installations. For legacy software, code reviews can be done to identify the most common security vulnerabilities. Protection of the source code on the installation facility is needed to prevent malicious actors from identifying vulnerabilities once inside an installation. Searching the installed configuration for known accounts and passwords to eliminate those hardcoded values is also recommended.

Action #5:	Adopt a role based security model, limiting user privileges to only those needed for specific tasks.
Benefit:	Limits the potential damage an attacker could accomplish after exploiting the vulnerabilities.
Considerations:	(none identified)

### **4.3 Discussion of Selected Protective Measures**

#### **4.3.1 Considerations for Encrypted Networks**

In several of the vulnerability categories, "encryption, where feasible" is recommended as a mitigation. The benefit of an encrypted data protocol is that it becomes substantially more difficult for an attacker to obtain usernames and passwords, reverse engineer the protocol, or insert malicious data streams. However, encryption of the control system data protocol can present performance issues, and increases the complexity of the system development and maintenance processes. Furthermore, encrypted data traffic becomes essentially opaque to network monitoring and intrusion detection systems. Although encryption can eliminate some vulnerabilities, the associated disadvantages are such that it will be suitable only after careful evaluation of operational constraints and network monitoring policies.

#### **4.3.2 Detection and Monitoring Tools**

Malware Detection. Antivirus, spyware and bot detectors are typically not used within the control system perimeter. The download of the signature-based virus scanners or the process of performing a scan may have the effect of a denial of service on most control system networks. Some vendors supply tested virus protection mechanisms with their systems; others require extensive testing prior to installing on the inner network. These capabilities are typically established at the control system perimeter as a minimum.

Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems Anomaly based intrusion detection systems (IDS) , which report deviations from a known traffic baseline, are suitable for control system network environments where a flood of traffic is not expected (such as exception reporting from end devices during bad weather) or if tuned for those incidents. The signature based IDS typically work on TCP/IP only and are not tuned for proprietary protocols found in control system networks. However, some work is being done in industry on vendor-independent IDS rules for common protocols, and some control system vendors are now providing guidelines for IDS monitoring.


Host based IDS (HIDS) can be used to detect new files on a host computer, system administrative access, and the escalation of privileges. Point data files (the status of the endpoints) change frequently and could lead to creation of very large log files, unless these data files are excluded from HIDS coverage. Another type of host-based IDS is a “canary” type of honeypot. This is a host that performs no function for the process control operations, and no other devices on a static addressed inner network would communicate with this host. If some process tries to communicate with the host, it alarms. This poison box can be used to detect attempts to enumerate the network.

Intrusion prevention systems (IPS) are less common on control systems. If the IPS is not carefully tuned for proprietary control system protocols, the active response may shutdown communications. For example, some configurations with many end devices use a Fieldbus architecture with the end devices only reporting on exception. During the restoration of end devices (e.g. after a storm), these end devices report their status back to the SCADA network. A User Datagram (UDP) type of protocol is common in these architectures. The flood of these packets can be misinterpreted as a denial of service attack on the network, and an IPS not tuned to the network will shutdown these connections during the critical stages of restoration.

All of these activities produce logs and are of little use unless the logs are reviewed on a regular basis. These logs aid in identifying what happened in an incident. The network dumps can also be used to verify what is being transmitted through the firewalls and what the normal network traffic looks like. This aids in tuning the firewalls and IDSs. The system logs allow the user to figure out the host activities. These logs can be reviewed together to determine the order of events.

#### **4.4 General Recommendation – A Proactive Security Model**

All the above recommendations can be used individually to improve the security configuration of the system on a piecemeal basis. However, this is a reactive approach that does not necessarily keep the overall security picture in mind. Current common practices in computer security recommend a proactive security model such as shown in Figure 1; the following description is adapted from Reference 1.



**Figure 1. Proactive security model**

- The first step is to map out the architecture and understand what components are in place and what their communication paths are. This step would have reduced the findings in the perimeter protection categories, where additional communications paths were identified.
- The next step is to perform a risk assessment. Understanding the impacts to the vulnerabilities and the threats is critical to focus resources on the assets where the threat or vulnerability has high impact.
- Understanding where the assets are located is required to ensure the physical protection of the assets.
- Creating a protection profile will aid in the understanding of what type of protection is needed for each critical asset. This will aid in the prioritization and allocation of resources.
- The identification and removal of vulnerabilities would eliminate the known vulnerabilities found in unpatched components and unused services.
- Creating a standardized policy ensures the efforts to harden the operating system or segment the network are not undone by poor configuration management practices.
- Retention of log files and procedures to respond to incidents is needed for recovery. Monitoring of the network logs would have detected the replay or man-in-the-middle type of vulnerabilities.
- Training of the users will aid in the policies being followed and what to do in case of a suspected cyber attack.



As the diagram suggests, a proactive security model is an ongoing process rather than a one-time activity. The typical lifespan of these systems, ten to fifteen years, further highlights the need for an ongoing security process.

## **5. CONCLUSION**

Spanning different control system vendor and asset owner configurations, the results summarized in this report describe vulnerabilities that were found to be common in field installations. Asset owners can use these observations, and the corresponding recommendations for mitigation, as a basis for enhancing the security of their control systems. Control system vendors, system integrators, and third-party vendors can use the lessons learned to enhance the security characteristics of current and future products.



## 6. REFERENCES

1. Anonymous, *Maximum Security, Fourth Edition*, Sams Publishing, Indianapolis, 2003.

